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bstract
he statement that there are laws that are simply “unenforceable” is quite common in Brazil. This study aims to analyze how incentives contribute
o the enforcement of formal rules. The laws chosen in this study are: land use and conservation law and agrochemicals law, focused on the storage
nd return of containers. The theoretical framework is based on transaction and measurement costs, and property rights. Five propositions were
eveloped for this study related to the incentives for the enforcement of formal rules, namely: the alignment of the formal rule with the social
orms; the influence of private interest; the influence of the State’s interest; monitoring costs; and adoption costs to formal norms. For the empirical
art, we opted for the multiple case study method, contemplated by analyses of descriptive statistics. It is worth noting that a cut out was made
n relation to the agricultural crops and regions selected. The results support four of the five propositions of this study. The exception was due to
he effect of the cost to adopt the rule. It was concluded that rules addressing assets of common ownership are characterized by a more complex
nforcement mechanism, since it does not involve a purely economic issue. Actions that raise the awareness on these rules and the awareness
egarding the scope of the subject are important so that the social rules, which do not change rapidly, can be in line with the formal rule, thus
romoting its enforcement.
2018 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
comum a afirmac¸ão de que existem leis que “não pegam”. No presente estudo foi feita uma análise acerca dos incentivos que contribuem para o
umprimento das normas formais. As leis escolhidas foram: a lei de uso e conservac¸ão do solo, e a lei dos agrotóxicos, com ênfase no armazenamento
retorno das embalagens. Como base teórica custos de transac¸ão e mensurac¸ão, e direitos de propriedade são utilizados. Foram fundamentadas
inco proposic¸ões de trabalho, que consideram os incentivos ao cumprimento das normas formais, a saber: alinhamento da norma formal às normas
ociais; a influência do interesse privado; a influência do interesse do Estado; custos de monitoramento; e custos de adesão às normas. Para a parte
mpírica optou-se pelo método de estudo de casos, contemplados por análises de estatísticas descritivas. Destaca-se que foi feito um recorte com
elac¸ão às culturas agrícolas e regiões selecionadas. Os resultados dão suporte a quatro das cinco proposic¸ões de trabalho. A excec¸ão ficou por conta
o efeito do custo de adesão à norma. Concluiu-se que normas que tratam dos bens de propriedade coletiva se caracterizam por um mecanismo de
umprimento mais complexo, já que não se trata de uma questão puramente econômica. Ac¸ões que promovam o conhecimento de tais normas e a
onscientizac¸ão da amplitude do tema são importantes para que as normas sociais, que não se modificam rapidamente, estejam alinhadas à norma
ormal promovendo o seu cumprimento.
2018 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
alavras-chave: Cumprimento da lei; Lei que não pega; Normas no agronegócio
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ntroduction
The Brazilian environmental legislation is one of the most
dvanced in protecting the environment. However, its enforce-
ent represents a challenge. According to Lunardi (2011, p. 67),
the mismatch between the elaboration and implementation of
aws and the official policies in the Brazilian state have proved
o be a major problem [...]”. Freitas (2008), in turn, emphasizes
hat in terms of environmental laws Brazil has one of the most
dvanced legislations in the world. What is necessary, in fact,
s to enforce them. Starting from this point and observing the
gribusiness systems (SAGs), it is noted that legal and regula-
ory issues have always had relevance for dealing with activities
hat involve food safety, sustainable management, preservation
nd recovery of the environment. In this sense, the present work
ocuses on the legal subject that deals with the environment and
griculture.
Following this notion, the objective of this study is to analyze
ow incentives inﬂuence the enforcement of positive norms in
gribusiness systems. This way, it discusses propositions which
resent evidence and translate the different types of incentives
or enforcement of the chosen laws in the scope of agribusi-
ess systems. These incentives are divided into: alignment of
he formal rule with social norms, interest of the State and pri-
ate agents, costs to comply with the formal rule and the coercive
ffort of the State. The focus of this study and its innovative effort
s to identify the incentives to enforce the rule ex ante, that is,
efore reaching the judiciary. Within the universe of legal rules
elating to the agribusiness systems, we selected environmen-
al legal rules. This choice is explained by the importance of
he environment, as a subject, and the growth of its strictness
s of the 90s.1 By analyzing the activities related to agribusi-
ess systems, it is possible to note that they are based on natural
esources or environmental assets.2
The balance between the preservation of environmental
onditions and agricultural development is an issue of great
mportance. In 1981, Romeiro and Abrantes postulated that the
ccelerated modernization of the sector, through the intensive
se of supplies and equipment, encouraged by the official policy,
ad a negative impact on the environment. They also mentioned
hat, in terms of productivity, these changes indicated no sig-
ificant results at that time (Romeiro & Abrantes, 1981). While
he productivity mentioned by the authors has since made sig-
ificant progress, the other aspect that they highlight still lacks,
owever, effective improvement. It is a challenge for which the
nvironmental legislation tries to establish the guidelines, in the
orm of rules, but that faces problems in the implementation
hase.
1 The study does not address the Forest Code because it is in the implementa-
ion phase.
2 According to the Brazilian Law, environmental assets are those of general
ublic interest, essential for the maintenance of the environmental quality. Thus,
t overrides the public or private legal nature that an asset may have (Direito
mbiental, 2002). The holders or owners of the environmental asset shall be at
he same time the government and civil society. Thus, there is the possibility
f having a private asset of general public interest and public asset of general
ublic interest (Direito ambiental, 2002).
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From a theoretical point of view, this work falls in the scope
f the New Institutional Economics (NIE). Within the NIE there
re studies that focus on the subject of enforcement, among
hich the works of Rubin (2005), Libecap (2005) and North
1990, 1992) stand out. In this logic, a non-positive norm can
ecome a positive norm depending on the incentives and inter-
sts involved, much in the same way a positive norm can be
dopted in order to modify habits and customs.
It is reasonable to assume that institutions do not always
volve in an efficient manner (Zylbersztajn & Sztajn, 2005).
illiamson (1996) addresses intentionally inefficient institu-
ions by stating that, in many cases, these intentional failures
re motivated by the capture of value from groups organized in
ociety. Organizational failures arise when the organizational
tructure implemented is less efficient than the best feasible
tructure. Thus, there is an intentional inefficiency, inefficient
y design, as the author classifies it. In addition, North (p. 05,
992) states that “institutions and the way they evolve shape eco-
omic performance. Together with the technology employed,
hey determine the cost of transacting and producing.” Based on
his guidance, the regulatory environment in which agents are
nserted has to be considered to avoid the risk of misleading or
naccurate conclusions (Zylbersztajn & Sztajn, op. cit.).
Ronald Coase, in the articleTheproblemof social cost (1960),
ighlights the third-party effects that occurs in exercising the
ight to perform certain actions. According to the author, the
ights of use production factors may be limited by the insti-
utional rules or may be negotiated privately. In this way the
xercise of the right to use a production factor may generate
ost to the other party (externality3). In this logic, considering
he transaction costs, the reallocation of rights will occur when
he increase in the social value generated is greater than the
osts incurred to implement it. Thus, the initial delimitation of
he legal rights influences market efficiency (Coase, 1960). Pub-
ic regulation, as it stands, does not operate cost-free and it not
lways increases the efficiency of social arrangement (Coase,
960). The State through governmental action can also seek to
orrect negative externalities caused by the incorrect or imper-
ect definition of property rights (Rubin, 2005). It is in this field
hat we find the laws of environmental preservation and of natu-
al resources, the focus of this study. The purpose of such rules
s to control externalities and allocate property rights.
Transaction costs, which are related to the costs of transfer,
apture and protection of property rights (Barzel, 1997), or, from
he perspective of Arrow (1969), represent the costs of making
he economic system work, are presented as a central item in the
nalysis of the state regulation’s impact on economic activity,
s well as on the efficiency of the social arrangement. Alston
nd Mueller (2005) define property rights as a set of formal and
nformal rights regarding the use and transfer of resources. They
etermine the incentives for using the resources. Alchian (1977)
tates that the rights of individuals to use the resources in a given
3 According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), externalities are positive or neg-
tive effects that the actions of an economic agent have on the welfare of others,
nd which are not regulated by the price system.
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of damages to public goods (common goods), it is not always
interesting to face the problem fully, since many resources80 B.L. Avelhan, D. Zylbersztajn / RAUSP
ociety are built and supported by the power of social customs
nd the State’s power of punishment.
Eggertsson (1990), in turn, distinguishes three categories of
roperty rights. The first is defined as the rights to use a good,
ncluding the right to physically transform or even destroy it.
ccasional restrictions that limit the set of permitted uses will
ffect the economic value of the good. The second refers to the
ight to obtain income over the asset and on the contract with
ther individuals. The third is the right to transfer the property
ights of the asset to other parties, that is, the right to dispose of
r sell an asset. It is understood that property rights are almost
lways restricted and partitioned in some way, for example,
hrough rules governing fishing seasons and fishing equipment
r the sale of drugs (Eggertsson, 1990). Therefore it is desirable
hat a legal system determine the property rights, that is, it is
mportant that the parties are able to unequivocally determine
ho is the owner of the asset and what this set of property rights
mplies (Rubin, 2005). From this brief thematic and theoreti-
al contextualization we present the study propositions. They
efer to the incentives to enforce positive rules. Following, the
ules of the empirical part are detailed. They are three formal
ules belonging to two environmental laws. After this, the arti-
le presents a description of the method, the analysis of the data
ollected and, finally the conclusion.
he propositions of study
roposition 01: alignment of the formal rule with social
ules
The first proposition presented is that laws that have low
cceptance are formal rules that come into total or partial
onfrontation with informal, socially accepted rules. Ellickson
1991) states that social rules represent a spontaneous order, that
s, voluntary agreements in the absence of coercion. However,
his spontaneous order does not mean no rules. De Soto (2003)
tates that the compatibility between social rules and codified
aws ensures that the law is followed by most citizens. When a
ormal law does not fit in to extralegal conventions, the parties
ffected by such law will react and reject it, according to the
uthor. From an economic standpoint, a state-sponsored system
f legal rules that ignores habits and customs incurs high trans-
ction costs compared to a system of formal rules deriving from
he community itself (Buscaglia & Ratliff, 2000).
According to Buscaglia and Ratliff (2000), when the informal
ules are captured by the formal legislation, the law will promote
fficiency. Laws that seek to impose and implement standards of
ehavior unrelated to the local reality tend to increase the attri-
ion, thus generating transaction costs, according to the authors.
owever, it should be noted that the “corrective rules4” have
heir role in Law and in the construction of codes to society.
4 The corrective rule is related to situations where there is a market failure or
nomaly. Thus, the market balance is not Pareto-optimal (Arida, 2005). It is in
his situation that the corrective rules are applied, that is, rules able to correct
he distortions found. An example of this case is given by externalities.
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ropositions 02 and 03: the inﬂuence of private interest and
he State’s interest
The second proposition is: The higher the private interest of
he parties affected by the formal rule, the greater the possibil-
ty of its enforcement. Private interest addresses the interest of
roups of influence, which may be unions, associations, profes-
ional associations, among others, the so called organizational
nvironment.5 Therefore, it is necessary to know the distributive
mpacts of the legal rule on individuals or groups of influence
ho may incur losses with the adoption of laws, even if socially
esirable. The adversely affected groups may block the adoption
f proposed advances (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) or, con-
ersely, contribute to the adoption of laws that generate value
or the group. Since government restrictions on the economic
ctivity may give rise to revenues, it is necessary to consider the
ompetition to obtain them (revenues), which interferes with the
ffectiveness of the laws (Krueger, 1974). The author explains
he social inefficiencies of the actions to achieve revenues by
rganized groups.
The third proposition is related to the State’s interest and can
e defined as follows: the higher the interest manifested by the
tate for the legal rule, the greater the possibility of enforcement.
anifested interest, in this case, is understood as mechanisms
hat demonstrate the State’s interest in the subject in question.
hus, both legislators and judges can contribute to the ineffi-
iency of a certain law. In addition, it is necessary to understand
hat laws are formulated, approved and enacted through govern-
ent entities, that is, it is the governments that supply the formal
nstitutions (Alston, 1996). Therefore, government actors often
ave the power to change or modify the rules regardless of their
onstituents, in addition to considering that the State is the only
gent that has police power, that is, government agents, who
upply the institutions and make up the state, often have greater
ower and means for a particular rule of interest to be approved
nd actually implemented.
ropositions 04 and 05: costs incurred to adopt the rule
nd costs to monitoring the adoption of formal rule
Proposition 04 is related to the costs incurred to monitor the
doption of the laws, and can be expressed as: the higher the
ost of monitoring the formal rule, the lower its level of enforce-
ent. According to Barzel (1997), a good is constituted by a
nite and potentially large set of attributes that allow variability.
n a transaction, it may be prohibitive for the State to protect
ll the attributes that make it up. Thus, despite the knowledgeay be necessary in comparison to the benefits achieved
5 The organizational environment is responsible for the provision of public
nd collective goods, whose supply is subject to the action of the State or pri-
ate interest organizations (Pereira, Souza & Cário, 2009). This environment
s characterized by structures developed to support the operation of the SAGs,
ncluding companies, universities, cooperatives and associations of producers,
esearch institutes, etc. (Zylbersztajn, 2005).
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Libecap, 2005). In this way, often the transaction costs for
efining and enforcing restrictions may be prohibitive for the
tate.
From the perspective of Barzel (2001), measurement costs
re at the origin of transaction costs. Specifically, the author
ighlights the importance of measuring the information costs
n the analysis of institutions. For the author, the transac-
ion process implies exchange of information, which has costs
o be measured or externalized, so the level of difficulty in
easuring such information will determine the type of rela-
ionship that exists. It is possible to extend this logic to the
elationship between the State (supervising agents) acting as
n entity of control and the economic agents affected by the
aws. Thus, the lower the level of difficulty of measuring the
ttributes involved, the greater the incentive for the State agents
o put in practice the norm, and also the incentive of eco-
omic agents to comply with the norm at stake. Following this
ogic, as the costs to obtain information regarding the breach
f the rule increase, the smaller the incentive for its enforce-
ent.
Proposition 05 is related to the costs affecting the economic
gents, defined as: The higher the cost to comply with the formal
ule by the economic agents, the lower its level of enforcement.
his proposition is related to the transaction and monetary costs
ncurred to comply with certain law. For a farmer to comply with
he law, it may be necessary to modify its production model,
hus incurring costs, direct and administrative costs. In the pres-
nce of positive costs, the incentive to comply with a certain
aw/rule falls. Often, there are levels of compliance or levels of
nforcement of the law (which consists of several rules). Thus,
t is possible that the farmer complies with a certain rule that
akes up the law but not others. Therefore, there are levels of
ompliance with the laws.
ules studied
he agrochemicals law: the storage and return of containers
Brazil is the largest consumer of pesticides in the world
Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária – ANVISA, 2012).
ccording to IBGE’s Report “Indicators of Sustainable Devel-
pment” 6.9 kilos of pesticides per hectare of planted area were
ommercialized in 2012 (IBGE, 2015). This fact is reflecting
n large part of its history, the extension of cultivation areas,
esides its agricultural “vocation.” And the interest of the indus-
ry in Brazil is explained: between the years 1977 and 2006 the
onsumption expanded by an average of 10% a year, and since
970 the country has been among the six largest consumers in
he world (Terrra, 2008). The storage and the disposal of the con-
ainers is regulated by Federal Law No. 7.802, July 11, 1989, as
ubsequently amended by Law No. 9.974 of June 6, 2000 and
egulated by Decree No. 4.074/02, No. 5.549/05, No. 5.981/06
nd No. 6.913/09.6 The Law of 1989 addresses the regulation of
6 The State of São Paulo relies on laws No. 4002/84 and No. 5.032/86 regulated
y Decree No. 44.038/99 that address pesticides.
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he survey, production, packaging and labeling, transportation
nd storage, commercialization, advertising, use, import and
xport, disposal of waste and packaging, registration, classifi-
ation, control, inspection and inspection control of pesticides,
heir components and the like (Brazil, 1989). The Law of 2000
ncluded the disposal of containers, assigning to the manufac-
urer the responsibility for the disposal of the product after its
onsumption, in addition to sharing the duties between resellers,
armers and the State. Thus, the State was geared toward assign-
ng to the manufacturers the responsibility of controlling the
ife cycle of the products offered by them (Boldrin et al.,
007).
In response to this understanding of the law, manufacturers
reated the National Institute for Processing Empty Containers
INPEV) in 2001, which is responsible for the transportation
nd disposal of empty containers for recycling or incineration,
n addition to carrying out educational and awareness cam-
aigns together with other members of the system (INPEV,
012). According to the 2011 Sustainability Report conducted
y INPEV, 34,202 tons of empty containers of pesticides were
rocessed, a figure that represents 94% of all plastic contain-
rs placed on the market and 80% of the total volume of
ontainers sold. This information reflects the development of
coordination in the process of return of empty containers,
hich was mainly coordinated by the manufacturers respon-
ible for the disposal. INPEV has 421 receiving units (307
tations and 114 centers) throughout the country, in addition
o conducting itinerant receiving initiatives. This modality rep-
esents 10% of the amount of returned containers (INPEV,
012).
Worth mentioning also are the main responsibilities assigned
y the law to each agent in the production system. Farmers are
esponsible for the triple wash of the containers and returning
hem to the places indicated in the invoice. The storage fol-
ows the manufacturer’s instructions and the current legislation
Brazil, 2002) in an exclusive, covered, ventilated place with
aterproof floors. Merchants are responsible for receiving the
mpty containers from the users and provide adequate facili-
ies for receiving and storing the empty containers until they
re collected by the companies responsible for the disposal of
he containers. Manufacturers are required to use appropriate
abels and leaflets containing instructions regarding the pro-
edures of use and disposal, and provide proper containers in
rder to prevent leaks, evaporation, loss or change of the con-
ent, to facilitate washing, sorting and recycling, and collect
he empty containers in the receiving units, and provide them
he adequate disposal. Thus, the non-fulfillment of the obliga-
ions of each agent may cause administrative, civil and criminal
enalties, in accordance with the legislation on environmental
rimes.
Depending on the severity of the irregularities, as judged by
he inspectors, the penalties may be light, a warning notice with
deadline to correct the founded irregularities, but also can beerious. In these cases there is an enforceable judgment and
he offender faces environmental crime charges. There is a fine
rovided in a state law (São Paulo state), but its application is
nconstitutional due to federal decree No. 4.074, of 2002. This
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tudy chose the rules7 for storage on farms and correct disposal
f empty containers by farmers as a target of empirical research.
and use and conservation: erosion
“The erosion of agricultural land has been characterized as
problem caused by agriculture both from the perspective of
nvironmental effects and from the problems caused to agri-
ultural production itself” (Marques & Pazzianotto, 2004). It is
stimated that 616.5 million tons of soil are lost on an annual
asis as a result of erosion (Dechen, Telles, Guimarães & De
aria, 2015). Approximately 80% of the area occupied by any
gricultural activity in São Paulo has a certain degree of erosion
Coordenadoria de Assistência Técnica Integral [CATI], 2013).
The Federal Law No. 6.225 of July 14, 1975, regulated by
ecree No. 77.775 of June 8, 1976 provides for the mandatory
mplementation of land protection plans and to combat erosion.
his law states that the applications for funding shall be granted
nly if accompanied by a certificate that provides such imple-
entation (Brazil, 1975). In addition to this federal law, the state
f São Paulo has the State Law No. 6.171 of July 4, 1988, as
mended by Laws No. 8.421 of November 23, 1993, and No.
1.970 of June 30, 2005 that provide for the use, conservation
nd preservation of agricultural land.8
The law of 1988 considers agricultural land as a heritage of
umanity, leaving its users with the obligation to preserve it –
rt. 1 (São Paulo, 1988). Thus, everyone who exploits agricul-
ural land is obliged to, among other things, pursuant to Article
of Decree No. 41.719/97: ensure the proper use and conserva-
ion of water in all its forms; control soil erosion in all its forms;
revent processes of desertification; prevent the deforestation of
reas unsuitable for agriculture, forestry and pastoral exploita-
ion and promote possible permanent vegetation in these areas,
hen deforested; and recover, maintain and improve the phys-
cal, chemical and biological characteristics of the agricultural
and (São Paulo, 1997).
The non-compliance with the state laws by the users of agri-
ultural land may lead to fines (ranging from 20 to 1000 Fiscal
nits of the State of São Paulo – UFESP9), payment of services
endered by the State to promote the recovery of the areas in
rocess of desertification and degradation, and publication in the
fficial Gazette of the names of the owners and their properties.
owever, the violator may submit, alternatively to a defense,
commitment to develop a project containing the determina-
ion of the classes of land use capacity of the determined area
nd a plan for the definition of the technology used for agri-
ultural land conservation to the Coordination of Agricultural
efense – CDA (Agency responsible for enforcing this law),
7 The legal rules (formal rules/positive rules) are created by a legislative chan-
el that we call law, expressed in words, properly ordered, which take the form
f an article, paragraph, item or section (Schmieguel, 2010). Therefore, law is a
et of formal rules.
8 These laws are regulated by the following State Decrees: Decree No. 41.719
f April 16, 1997; Decree No. 42.056 of August 6, 1997; Decree No. 44.884 of
ay 11, 2000; Decree No. 45.273 of October 6, 2000.
9 A UFESP unit corresponds to R$ 23.55 in the year 2016.
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ormally undertaking to implement it within the deadline. By
hoosing to develop the project, the application of the penalty
emains suspended up to the end of the deadline specified for the
mplementation of the technical conservation project and, if duly
ulfilled, the notice of infraction is canceled (São Paulo, 1997).
hus, the rules related to the combat and control of erosion set
ut in the state law of 1988 were applied in the empirical phase
f this study. See below a table related to CDA’s activities over
he years.
According to the data, it can be seen that the inspection activ-
ty increased up to 2004, decreased in the following years, and
tarted increasing again in 2008. In the following years there
as an oscillation in this tendency of growth and in recent years
t is possible to notice a decrease in the number of inspections.
egarding the number of notices of infraction, there was growth
ntil 2003, following the growth in the number of inspections
hat declined from 2004 to 2008. Since 2009, although there
as been a general decline in inspections (compared to previous
ears), it can be noted that the number of notices of infraction
ad a tendency for growth only to fall down again in recent years.
Moreover, the larger the area inspected, the higher the num-
er of damaged areas detected. These represent approximately
0–20% of the number of total inspected area until 2008, except
or the years 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2008, in which this per-
entage represented, respectively, 2.7%, 24%, 7.3% and 8.6%.
etween 2009 and 2012 there was an increase in the propor-
ion of damaged areas, compared to the total inspected, of over
0%. However, in the following years the percentage returned
o between 10% and 20% of the total inspected, according to
able 1. In this sense, CDA has been able to increase efficiency
n its work over the years. This can be verified by the percent-
ges of damaged areas and the total area inspected over the years,
nd also by the data indicating that even with the decrease in the
umber of inspections there was an increase in the number of
otices of infraction, even if in percentage terms.
The agrochemicals law imputes obligations and rights to all
gents integrating the SAG and imposes incentives for the devel-
pment of coordinated actions between the links of the chain so
hat they comply with their obligations. The land use and con-
ervation law assigns the obligations exclusively to farmers, and
oes not determine the involvement of any other segment of the
hain to share the responsibilities regarding the enforcement of
he rules. It can be seen that the incentives for the enforcement
f positive regulations, especially in the environmental area, are
ufficiently complex, given their characteristic of regulating the
se of common goods (Rubin, 2005).
ethodological procedures
The method chosen was a multiple case study, accompa-
ied by descriptive statistics and correlation analysis (Pearson’s
orrelation). The choice of cases is intentional, and contem-
lates two levels of compliance with the rules. The laws chosen
ere the Agrochemicals Law (Law No. 7802/089 and Law No.
974/00), focused on the rules for the storage at farms and rules
or the return of empty pesticide containers, and the State Law
or the Use and Conservation of Agricultural Land (Law No.
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Table 1
Summary of inspections carried out between 1999 and 2015.
Year Inspections Total inspected area (ha) Area with damage (ha) Area with damage/fiscalized (%) Notice of infactions
1999 10 200 20 10 10
2000 34 1825 50 2.7 34
2001 956 35,412 4110 11.6 93
2002 1296 104,816 19,397 18.5 378
2003 1203 100,214 17,289 17.3 482
2004 1841 71,242 17,066 24 411
2005 1677 34,155 5202 15.2 301
2006 1228 8639 939 10.9 57
2007 1094 14,636 1062 7.3 72
2008 1529 11,502 993 8.6 73
2009 942 10,747 4091 38.1 160
2010 1834 52,359 18,311 35 373
2011 1208 34,023 11,308 33.2 223
2012 959 40,036 9685 24.2 257
2013 651 48,656 7015 14.4 328
2014 803 44,337 8247 18.6 261
2
S
6
r
r
a
o
t
i
o
o
r
p
o
b
f
e
c
a
o
u
b
c
e
P
s
P
r
t
t
s
f
c
o
q
d
t
w
o
a
s
t
s
r
i
o
t
m
r
O
a
O
r
P
and 08 in the region of Ribeirão Preto. It should be noted that
the sample is non-probabilistic. It is an intentional sample based
on the indication of typical producers and agronomists from the
11 It is worth noting that for the application of the questionnaires we chose one015 644 28,873 3525
ource: Internal data of CDA.
171/88, Law No. 8421/93 and Law No. 11970/05), focused on
ules to prevent and control the erosion of agricultural land. The
ule for the return of empty pesticide containers present high
dherence, while the norms of storage and use and conservation
f land have lower adherence.
The research was divided into two phases: the first phase iden-
ified the formal rules that are addressed. Two semi-structured
nterviews were conducted with the supervisory body of the laws
f interest, in this case the Coordination of Agricultural Defense
f São Paulo – CDA. Each interview was made with the person
esponsible for each law of interest. We elected the sugarcane
roduction and cattle farming activities as the target of the sec-
nd phase of the research. The choice of sugarcane is justified
ecause it is a crop with intensive use of agrochemicals and also
or offering adequate land coverage, with possibility to, if prop-
rly managed, prevent erosion. As for cattle farms, they were
hosen because they adopt a technology that is less intensive on
grochemicals and also because they indicate a lower protection
f the soil.
Therefore, in the first phase, we outlined the formal rules
nder study and the crops on which the second phase was
ased. We selected five regions of sugarcane cultivation and
attle farms,10 in the State of São Paulo, based on the lat-
st Census of Agriculture of the State of São Paulo – LUPA
roject 2007/2008 and data from IBGE (2013). The regions cho-
en were: Andradina, Arac¸atuba, Presidente Prudente, Ribeirão
reto, and São José do Rio Preto. The second phase of the
esearch was to identify, from the perspective of the farmers,
he costs and incentives for the compliance with the rules and
he enforcement mechanisms. The information was collected via
10 For data from IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), for
ugarcane crops, we took into account the planted area in hectares by region. As
or cattle farming, the effective number of cattle (heads) by region was adopted as
riterion, together with data from the 2007/2008 LUPA Project (Census Survey
f Agricultural Production Units in the State of São Paulo).
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uestionnaires,11 seeking to address the research propositions
escribed above, especially the first, fourth and fifth proposi-
ions. We asked assertive questions based on which the farmers
ould indicate the level of agreement for each one of the rules,
n a scale of zero to five (zero being disagreement, five strong
greement). Chart 01 shows the correspondence between the
tatements and the propositions, and Chart 02 shows the ques-
ions for the identification of the compliance with the rules.
To obtain additional information about all the propositions
tudied we conducted semi-structured interviews12 with the five
egional offices of CDA. The purpose was to have access to the
nspection procedures and regional characteristics, such as: type
f soil; relief; profile of the typical farmer; level of adoption of
echnology, etc. We also surveyed the support structures that
onitor law enforcement.
Thus, the second phase included five interviews with rep-
esentatives of the inspection body in the regions – Regional
ffices of CDA, and a total of 38 questionnaires applied to sug-
rcane producers and/or cattle farmers in the regions under study.
f this total, 07 questionnaires were applied in the Andradina
egion; 10 in the Arac¸atuba region; 06 in the region of Presidente
rudente; 07 questionnaires in the São José do Rio Preto region;unicipality in each one of the regions studied. The choice of these five cities
ollowed the suggestion of regional offices. Thus, for conducting the in loco
pplication of the questionnaires to producers, we initially made a telephone
all to each one of the Agricultural Houses in the municipalities selected. Based
n that, we scheduled a day for the researcher to visit the Agricultural Houses to
pply the questionnaires to the producers who were there and met the established
riteria (being a sugarcane producer and/or cattle farmer).
12 It is worth noting that all interviews with the inspection body, at the head-
uarters and regional offices, were made in person. The only exception was for
he regional of São José do Rio Preto, in which the interview was answered via
mail, due to the impossibility to schedule a personal interview.
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Chart 01
Correspondence between the research propositions and the assertive questions of the questionnaire.
Propositions Logic used
Monetary cost 05: cost of compliance with
the formal rule by farmers
Production costs
Bureaucratic cost 05: cost of compliance with
the formal rule by farmers
Transaction costs
Amount of time spent 05: cost of compliance with
the formal rule by farmers
Transaction costs
Difficulty in adapting the method used previously 01: formal rule versus
informal rules
Compatibility between formal rule
(positive) and informal rules (habits
and customs)
Intensity of inspection 04: Cost incurred by the State
to monitor the rule
Transaction costs/measurement costs
Difficulty in conducting the inspection 04: Cost incurred by the State
to monitor the rule
Transaction costs/measurement costs
Source: Authors.
Chart 02
Questions to identify the compliance with the rules.
Rules Requirements of the rulea Identification of compliance – questions
Land
conservation
• Apply conservation techniques when working with the land; How is the land of the agricultural property?
• Prevent/control erosion processes; What are the land conservation practices that the farmer performs?
• Recover, maintain or improve soil conditions. Do you use grid or plow? In which situations?
Is there any point of erosion on the property?
Storage of pesticides
• Exclusive for pesticides; How is the pesticide
storage facility?• Covered place, masonry construction;• Waterproof floor.
Return of empty
containers
• Triple wash (when necessary) of containers; Are the empty containers used for any purpose, or are they unusable?
• Return the containers at the place indicated in the Invoice. Where are the empty containers returned to?
How far is the property from the place of return of empty containers?
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appeared in six answers; the use of direct planting appearedSome requirements of the rules were chosen under consideration that they c
he rule in question.
ource: Authors.
arm houses visited. After these steps, the information collected
as tabulated in order to allow its analysis.
resentation of results
roﬁle of respondents
Most of the rural producers interviewed are aged between
6 and 55 years old, representing 42% of the sample, and
ave completed primary education, also representing 42%. Most
espondents (45%) have more than 30 years of experience in
he activity. We noted that 17 (45%) are cattle farmers (cattle
reeding of meat and/or milk) only; 16 (42%) are sugarcane pro-
ucers; and 05 (13%) are cattle farmers, but have lands that are
eased for sugarcane.13 In relation to cattle farmers, corn stood
ut as an alternative crop. For sugarcane producers, soybeans
tood out more often. It was observed that 37 of the 38 respon-
ents are owners of the property in which they work, with only
ne partner. Among the 37 owners, eight are also tenants. Half
f the respondents (18) have another source of income. Most
13 There was also a single sugarcane producer who was also a cattle farmer.
owever, we decided to include him in this category.
i
t
Tindicate, through the application of questionnaires, the compliance or not with
espondents (47%) have an area under cultivation14 of between
1 and 200 hectares; 29% have areas smaller than 50 hectares
nd 24% have areas exceeding 200 hectares. With regard to
he characteristics of the land of farmers, 81.6% – 31 of the 38
espondents – have a source of water (spring, river, stream, dam)
vailable. Most have rough terrain in specific areas, usually near
he water source: 26 (68.4%) producers checked this option; 10
26.3%) stated that their lands are virtually flat; and only two
5.3%) have rough terrain.
and use and conservation
With respect to soil conservation practices, the most widely
sed technique was the use of contour line, followed by the
asture renewal practice. The third practice was crop rotation
nd the fourth, green manure. The use of built-in terrace15n four answers, all sugarcane producers that make crop rota-
ion with soybeans. The least frequent practice was the use of
14 It includes: own areas and leased areas in which the producers work.
15 The use the built-in terrace was not among the options in the questionnaire.
he answers were spontaneous.
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rrigation.16 Nine producers among the 38 respondents stated
hat they have points of erosion on their properties and three of
hem said that the point of erosion is in the leased area. Among
he nine producers in question, two stated that the erosions on
heir properties are old; three said that they were recent erosions,
ecause of the rains; one said that it was a gully; and three said
hat the erosion was dry. Regarding the costs to adopt the rules,
he respondents indicated, on a scale of zero to five, the level of
osts to apply the practices that prevent erosion.
With respect to the monetary cost, the average of the answers
as the index of 2.8 with coefficient of variation of 42.2%. The
ureaucratic cost, which sought to, along with the amount of
ime spent, capture the transaction cost, obtained an average of
.8 with a coefficient of 82.4% for the entire sample, a wide vari-
tion. The amount of time spent indicated an average of 2.6 with
coefficient of variation of 39.4%. With respect to the difﬁculty
f adapting the previous practices to the current practices, the
verage of the sample was 2.5, with a coefficient of variation of
7.5%. As for the intensity of inspection, the average was 1.6,
ith coefficient of variation of 69.3%. With regard to the difﬁ-
ulty for the inspection body do conduct its work in the opinion
f producers, the average was 2.0, with coefficient of variation of
1%. In all of the above items there was no statistical difference17
etween the averages of sugarcane producers and cattle farm-
rs. In addition, a correlation matrix18 between the variables
ssociated with propositions 01, 04 and 05 (Chart 01) and the
ariable representing the compliance (or not) with the rules stud-
ed (obtained through the questions in Chart 02) was made.
or this norm there was no significant correlation19 between
he variables representing the propositions and the dependent
ariable.
torage of pesticides
Most producers interviewed are irregular in this practice.
nly three farmers (all from Ribeirão Preto region and sugar-
ane producers), of a total of 36 respondents (for this rule), are
egular, that is, the place of storage is exclusive, covered, with
aterproof floor and masonry. Thirteen respondents answered
ptions that categorize them as partially irregular, because the
lace of storage is not exclusive to pesticides, although they meet
he other requirements. Seven producers have a covered facil-
ty for the storage, but the site does not have waterproof floor
nd the construction is not made of masonry. Six respondents
nswered that there is no facility previously determined for the
torage of pesticides. The other producers have a covered facil-
ty but the construction is not made of masonry and/or the floor
s not waterproof.
Next, the respondents indicated the adoption costs to rules,
n a scale of zero to five, for the storage of pesticides. Regarding
16 This, too, was a spontaneous response.
17 Statistical calculations of differences in the average values were all made
onsidering 90% confidence.
18 SPSS Statistics Software version 19 was used.
19 Significant correlation: at the 0.01 or 0.05 level.
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he monetary cost, the average of answers was 1.7 with a coeffi-
ient of variation of 62.5. The bureaucratic cost had an average
f 1.5 with a coefficient of 92.3% for the entire sample, a wide
ariation. The amount of time spent indicated an average of 1.1
ith a coefficient of variation of 63.2%. With respect to the difﬁ-
ulty of adapting the previous practices to the current practices,
he average of the sample was 2.2, with a coefficient of variation
f 67.2%. As for the intensity of inspection, the average was 1.3,
ith coefficient of variation of 71.7%. With regard to the difﬁ-
ulty for the inspection body do conduct its work in the opinion
f producers, the average was 1.8, with coefficient of variation
2.3%. Statistically, in all of the above items, there was no sta-
istical difference between the averages of sugarcane producers
nd cattle farmers. For this norm, the correlation matrix also did
ot present significant indices between the variables associated
ith the work propositions and the variable that represents the
ompliance (or not) of storage rules in the farm.
eturn of pesticide containers
The vast majority of producers return the containers, at the
etailers or at the receiving units, or they wait for the itiner-
nt collections. Out of the 36 respondents, in relation to the
grochemicals Law, one respondent uses pesticides, but has not
et returned the containers. Another respondent, a cattle farmer,
tated that he uses a low amount of pesticide and has always
ncinerated the containers. With regard to the use of empty con-
ainers, among the 34 producers who return them, two answered
hat they use part of the empty containers. Thus, out of a total of
5 respondents to this rule, three are not in accordance with the
aw. One because he burns the containers instead of returning
hem and the other two because they use part of the empty con-
ainers for other purposes instead of returning them. With regard
o the costs to adopt the practice, the respondents indicated, on
scale of zero to five, the level of costs to return the empty
ontainers. With respect to the monetary cost, the average of the
nswers was 1.4 with coefficient of variation of 81.8%. For the
ugarcane producers, the average obtained was 1.8 and for cat-
le farmers the average was lower (0.9). The bureaucratic cost
btained an index of 1.5 with a coefficient of variation of 91.4%
or the entire sample, a wide variation. For sugarcane producers,
he average was 2.1 and for cattle farmers the average was lower
1.0).
Amount of time spent indicated an average of 1.4 with a coef-
cient of variation of 69.2%. With respect to the difﬁculty of
dapting the previous practices to the current practices, the
verage of the sample was 2.6, with a coefficient of variation
f 57.2%. Statistically, in the two items above there was no evi-
ence that the average of sugarcane producers may be different
rom the average of cattle farmers. As for the intensity of inspec-
ion the average was 1.3 with coefficient of variation of 71.6%.
ith regard to the difﬁculty for the inspection body do conduct
ts work in the opinion of producers, the average was 1.6, with
oefficient of variation 67.7%. Statistically, there was also no
vidence that the average of sugarcane producers may be dif-
erent from the average of cattle farmers in the last two items.
inally, when the rural producers were asked about the benefits
186 B.L. Avelhan, D. Zylbersztajn / RAUSP Man
Chart 03
Presentation of the incentive indexes for the three rules.
Erosion Storage Return of
containers
Monetary cost Average 2.8 1.7 1.4C. variation* 42.2% 62.5% 81.8%
Bureaucratic
cost
Average 1.8 1.5 1.5
C. variation* 82.4% 92.3% 91.4%
Time spent Average 2.6 1.1 1.4C. variation* 39.4% 63.2% 69.2%
Difficulty in adapting the
method used previously
Average 2.5 2.2 2.6
C. variation* 57.5% 67.2% 57.2%
Intensity of inspection Average 1.6 1.3 1.3C. variation* 69.3% 71.7% 71.6%
Difficulty in conducting
the inspection
Average 2.0 1.8 1.6
C. variation* 71% 72.3% 67.7%
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ource: Authors.
f performing the storage and disposal of pesticide containers,
nly two of the 32 producers answered access to credit facili-
ies, in addition to preserving the environment. In addition, it
as noted that the issue of risk to health was not mentioned in
ny of the answers.
With regard to the analysis correlation of this rule a signifi-
ant correlation of the variable associated with compliance with
he norm and the variables “time spent” with a value – 0.376 at
evel 0.05, and “difﬁculty of adaptation” with a value – 0.433
t level 0.01. From these results a logistic regression was per-
ormed between the variable associated with compliance with
he norm (dependent) and the explanatory variables.20 How-
ver, none of the coefficients presented statistical significance,
onsidering 95% confidence.
nalysis
Based on the theory, we present three types of incentives: one
rom the design of the rule (proposition 01); another related to
he interests of the various actors in the rules (propositions 02
nd 03); and the last one related to the costs of these actors to
ulfill the rules (propositions 04 and 05). From the perspective of
he first type of incentive, it was noted that the three rules were
n conflict with the practices of farmers (social norms) which,
ccording to the theory, increases the cost of adoption. However,
here was a change in the behavior of producers in relation to the
hree rules of study, as it can be seen by the rate indexes in Chart
3 (all above 2.0). These results present evidence that supports
he proposition in question. Society began to pay greater atten-
ion to the issue of environment preservation, causing producers
o reflect on their practices. Thus these are corrective norms,
s categorized by Arida (2005). They are norms that have the
bjective of modifying or adjusting a pattern of behavior that
ntails negative externalities, the so-called social costs.
By analyzing the design of the rules, it can be seen that the
and conservation rule indicates the resource of adjustment of
20 The method adopted was the Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio).
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onduct. It generates a positive incentive for the compliance
ith the practice, exempting the irregular farmer from punitive
esources. Although there are initial costs to adjust the conduct,
he farmer will soon see benefits in terms of crop productivity.
s for the storage rule, we have not identified clear incentives
or changing the habits in the design of the rule. The farmers do
ot see benefits in incurring costs to adapt the storage facility, in
ddition to the fact that there is no penalty fine for violations of
he agrochemicals law. This coupled with the scarce inspection
ontributes to the maintenance of irregularities, at their various
egrees. In the latter case, the index that refers to the change of
abit was 2.2. It is an important index, in the sense that there was
change of habits toward the principles of the formal rule. How-
ver, its high index of non-compliance, considering all degrees
compliance with three basic requirements of the rule) indicates
hat it is necessary to outline other incentives, or that there should
e more effective incentives, contemplating the various profiles
f rural producers.
Finally, the rule for the return of containers determines that
he manufacturers are the agents responsible for the final dis-
osal. This configuration allows for the costs of adopting this
ule to be distributed between all members of the chain. It is the
anufacturer who has greater power of coordination, due to,
mong other factors, the fact that they are more concentrated, in
ddition to being the segment that has more information about
he product in question. Thus, the State is able to “optimize”
ts inspection efforts and the manufacturers are encouraged to
oordinate the change presenting practical mechanisms to the
armers so that the reverse flow occurs.
This configuration of the rule for the return of containers
eads to proposition 02 (private interest in formal rules) of
his study, which also indicated evidence for its acceptance.
he main information that provided basis for the analysis of
his proposition was obtained through the interviews conducted
t the CDA units (at headquarters and in the regional ones).
t is only in the agrochemicals law that there is the pres-
nce of private entities representing the sector, in particular the
ndustry, which coordinates the reverse logistics, also bring-
ng to the farmers information to raise awareness about the
eed and importance of the disposal. This is the rule with the
ighest degree of compliance. In contrast, the rule for storage
ndicated the highest rate of non-compliance. This particular
ule depends and is of interest only to farmers. We have not
dentified actions carried out by private representation orga-
izations. As for the law for land use and conservation, it
as found that the involvement of the private sector is also
bsent. However, in the case of sugarcane, the mills showed
nterest in their suppliers maintaining high levels of produc-
ivity. Therefore, the mills provide technical assistance and
nance inputs to suppliers. In this sense, the degree of adop-
ion of technology among sugarcane producers is higher in
omparison with cattle farmers, who have no support from
ther agents of this agribusiness system or representation enti-
ies, as evidenced by the interviews in regional offices. Thus,
t can be seen that private interest is a relevant factor to
he understanding of incentives for the compliance with the
ules.
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the three rules on the “difficulty of adapting the previous prac-
tices to the current practices,” it is noted that these are average
indices, indicating that the laws have achieved some success inB.L. Avelhan, D. Zylbersztajn / RAUSP
As for the third proposition, with regard to the State’s inter-
st in the rule, we noted indicative elements which confirm the
roposition in question. The main information that provided
asis for the analysis of this proposition was obtained through
he interviews conducted at the CDA units (at headquarters and
n the regional ones). Regarding the agrochemicals law, on the
art of federal agencies, there is a structured program called
NCRC (National Plan for the Control of Residues and Con-
aminants), which includes the CDA with a sanitary education
rogram. In addition, as it can be seen, the inspection of the
grochemicals law is a routine activity in most regional offices
nterviewed. A situation that does not occur with the land use and
onservation law, which is inspected by the offices interviewed
ainly through complaints, although the degree of importance
f the erosion problem in all surveyed regions is deemed high,
anged from seven to eight on a scale of zero to ten. The only
xception was the Ribeirão Preto region (two on the scale), in
hich the interviewee stated that there are specific and local-
zed problems. It is worth noting that most offices (four of the
ve interviewed) pointed out that one of the main sources of
roblems related to erosion does not lie in agriculture, but in the
onstruction and maintenance of the road system (highways and
ural roads). Those responsible for monitoring the conditions of
he roads are the public agencies (DER – Department of High-
ays) and, when it involves rural roads, it is the responsibility
f the municipalities.
Another information, though in the opposite direction, was
he issuance, by the CDA, of an ordinance in 2012 requiring
hat sugarcane plants request a certificate attesting the com-
liance with the legislation adopted in São Paulo for the use,
onservation and preservation of soil. This ordinance was issued
onsidering that CETESB (Environmental Company of the State
f São Paulo) started requiring from the plants the regularity
f their own agricultural properties and of their suppliers with
egard to the provisions set out in this law. Thus, the ordinance
f CDA demonstrates an attempt by the government agencies
o promote the coordination of sugarcane agribusiness system
gents so that the law is enforced. Therefore, in this case (land
aw), there is a misalignment of efforts between the public
gencies. Resuming the agrochemicals law, there is a contrast
etween the rules studied (the most and the least enforced). What
ay explain this disparity, although this law is of interest to three
inistries (Agriculture, Environment and Health), is the active
articipation of private agents in one of them (return of con-
ainers), with the creation of reverse logistics mechanisms, and
he lack of interest of these agents in the rule for the storage at
farm. In this context, it can be seen that the State’s interest
s a factor to be considered in the understanding of incentives
lthough it is clear that its efforts are often scattered and there-
ore see interference from many actors. This fact often gets in
he way of the interest manifested by its actions, and they fail to
each the desired extent.
With regard to analysis of costs, from both State and rural
roducers, we have the last two propositions. For proposition
4, regarding the cost incurred to monitor the formal rule, there
s evidence for the non-rejection. The main information that inte-
rates the analysis of this proposition was obtained through the tagement Journal 53 (2018) 178–189 187
nterviews done in the units of the CDA. With respect to the
wo laws (and the three rules), it is possible to note that these
ules for the State to conduct the monitoring (measurement) of
rregularities are expensive. Enforcing them demands a consid-
rable number of personnel, in addition to the training they must
ndergo to properly identify the irregularities. We noticed that,
n most regionals, for both laws, the respondents stated that they
equire more inspectors (usually double the current number) for
better inspection. The only exception was for the land law in
he Ribeirão Preto region, in which the respondent stated that
he degree of importance of the problem of erosion is low.
Also, it can be see that between the two laws, the land law
ndicates higher information costs. For the agrochemicals law
hrough the inspection of retailers it is possible to obtain evi-
ence of producers who consume more pesticides, therefore the
elevant producers for the inspection of the law. With regard to
he land use and conservation law there is no “source” that pro-
ides evidence of places with major problems, thus hindering
he access to relevant information. Therefore, if the incentive
o comply with the rules relied solely on the State’s moni-
oring capacity, all three rules would indicate a high rate of
on-compliance. The low figures (all below 2.0, as shown in
hart 03) for the three rules regarding the perception of rural
roducers on the intensity of inspection reinforces that idea.
Regarding the proposition related to the costs incurred by
roducers – proposition 05, there is evidence of its rejection.
s shown in Chart 03, the rule with the highest degree of non-
ompliance, the storage rule, was not the one with the highest
verage regarding the monetary cost and amount of time spent.
egarding the bureaucratic cost,21 statistically there was no evi-
ence that the average of the three rules is different. With respect
o the two first-mentioned costs, the rule with the highest aver-
ge was land law in both cases. The high degree of compliance
espite its high costs can be explained by the fact that the pro-
ucer sees benefits that outweigh the costs incurred with its
ompliance (example: improvement in land quality) – benefits
hat the producers are unable to notice if they invest in an ade-
uate facility for the storage of pesticides. Although the rates
or proposition 05 have indicated its rejection, it is necessary
o highlight its relevance in addressing incentives for the com-
liance with rules that seek to reduce externalities, but not in
solation, considering the other types of incentives.
onclusion
As noted above, the three rules can be considered corrective
ules (Arida, 2005). By permitting adjustment of conduct (in
he agrochemicals law only in less severe cases) before puni-
ive action is taken they promote the option of correcting the
roblem. When considering again the producers’ responses to21
“Bureaucratic cost” and “amount of time spent” sought to raise the transac-
ion costs.
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heir intention to correct habits that generated social costs. How-
ver, it was observed that one of the rules, regarding storage, has
very high index of non-compliance by the farmers. The expla-
ation is in the fact that farmers do not see benefits in improving
heir facility, only costs. Considering this fact together with the
igh costs of monitoring the law, by the inspection body, which
esult in a low level of inspection intensity, besides the lack
f interest on the part of organizational (private) agents, makes
he non-conformity index high in this case. The other rule of
grochemicals law, the return of empty containers, conversely,
s followed by the majority of the farmers interviewed. One
xplanation for the high adherence may be the fact that the law
mposes a need for coordination among the agents of agribusi-
ess system and assigns the final destination of the packaging to
he manufacturer. Thus, there is “pressure” among the members
f the chain for the law to be enforced. Combining this with
he fact that it is not a costly rule to the producer encourages
ompliance with it.
With respect to the last rule, in order to avoid erosion, nine
f the 38 interviewees stated that they have erosion points in the
reas that they work with. For this norm, it should be noted that
here is no clear rule, but many that contribute to prevent erosion
nd vary from context to context (soil type, climatic conditions,
mong others). It is a law which, for farmers, is often difficult
o understand. This is justified by analyzing the responses in the
egional offices about the bad habits to the law that still persist.
he answer in all the interviews was the superficial view that
he farmers have about what is land conservation, as well as the
nsistence of many of them not to resort to technical assistance
outinely. However, this rule was in the middle position. One
xplanation is that farmers believe that they are doing what is
ecessary for land conservation, although they may often not be
oing their best.
Given the results and the analysis, it can be seen that norms
hat aim at the public good and/or the reduction of externalities
re rules that have a more complex “mechanism” of enforce-
ent, since they involve heterogeneous actors, besides the fact
hat they are of interest to every citizen who makes up society,
re rules of diffuse interest. This is not a purely economic issue,
hat is, costs are not the main factor, although they are rather
elevant. A more accurate look at the problem and its possible
olutions is necessary, taking into account the characteristics of
he actors involved (Libecap, 2005). According to the author, it is
ecessary to impose some limits on individual behavior that best
ranslate the expanded notion of the common good, benefits and
ocial costs. If this does not happen, only private calculations
f net benefits will govern resource use decisions. In addition,
ibecap (2005) notes the need for clear legal definitions of prop-
rty rights with the increasing number and heterogeneity of the
arties involved.
Thus, it is noted that it is necessary that rules that seek to leg-
slate the environmental theme promote educational actions and
nowledge to the agents of interest consistently. Practices, old
abits do not change rapidly, so this is a phase of great impor-
ance for the rule to be understood and voluntarily complied with
y the target agents. The corrective logic (and not punitive, at
rst) of the rules studied is a signaling in this sense. In addition,
Cagement Journal 53 (2018) 178–189
orms that deal with environmental issues must contemplate
he entire production chain (agribusiness system) so that each
ink has its attributions and rights. Particularly in agribusiness
ystems there is great dependence among the actors, therefore,
ctions that contemplate this logic of dependence between the
egments are necessary.
Finally, with regard to the conception of this work, it is nec-
ssary to point out that no studies were found that address the
ncentives to comply with formal rules related to the theme
f “unenforceable” laws. The importance of this study lies in
he fact that it has searched for evidence that better explain the
henomenon on which it has focused.
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